Applying the Constitutional Doctrine of Irrebuttable Presumption to the Handicapped - Gurmankin v. Costanzo by Richman, Daniel A.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 4 Summer 1978: Symposium - 
Employment Rights of the Handicapped 
Article 12 
Applying the Constitutional Doctrine of Irrebuttable Presumption 
to the Handicapped - Gurmankin v. Costanzo 
Daniel A. Richman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel A. Richman, Applying the Constitutional Doctrine of Irrebuttable Presumption to the Handicapped - 
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 27 DePaul L. Rev. 1199 (1978) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol27/iss4/12 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
NOTES
APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
OF IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
TO THE HANDICAPPED-
GURMANKIN V. COSTANZO
Employment rights of the handicapped have received increasing at-
tention in the courts over the past several years. New statutory bases
for challenging handicap discrimination have been developed and
tested, ' and attempts have been made to adapt long-standing legal
theories to the handicap context. In the recent case of Gurnankin v'.
Costanzo, 2 the constitutional doctrine of irrebuttable presumption, an
old analysis recently resurrected, 3 emerged as a theory under which
a disabled plaintiff might successfully challenge discriminatory
employment policies.
In Gurinankin, a United States district court held that a Philadel-
phia School District policy of not considering handicapped persons for
teaching positions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it contained an irrebuttable presumption 4 that
1. See Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title
VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814 (1977).
2. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. The first cases decided on irrebuttable presumption grounds were Schlesinger v. Wis-
consin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926), and Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). In both, the statutes
involved were found to contain impermissible presumptions that any gift made within a certain
period before the donor's death was made in contemplation of death, rendering it susceptible to
estate tax. After falling into disuse for approximately fifty years, the doctrine was revived in
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); and Turner v. Department
of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam). In addition, commentators argue that
the doctrine was invoked in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See authorities cited in note 56 infra.
4. A presumption in the law of evidence is an assumption of a fact (hereinafter called fact
B) resulting from a rule of law which requires such a fact to be assumed from another fact or
group of facts (hereinafter called fact(s) A) found or otherwise established in the action. If the
party against whom the presumption operates may introduce proof in contradiction of it, the
presumption is rebuttable. An irrebuttable, or conclusive, presumption is one in which, upon
proof of fact A, fact B is always and necessarily accepted as proved. That is, upon proof of fact
A, the party against whom the presumption works is precluded from asserting the non-truth of
fact B. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 802-04 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
See also Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1534 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]. See generally Brosman, The Statutory Pre-
sumnption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17 (1930); Stumbo, Presumptions-a View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN
L.J. 182 (1964).
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no handicapped person is competent to teach. Unfortunately, the
precedential value of Gurmankin is somewhat limited by its faulty
reasoning. This Note will criticize the Gurmankin court's analysis,
which wrongly applied the Supreme Court decision of Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 5 and will indicate the shortcomings
of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine that the court employed.
Finally, the Note will suggest a more principled, alternative analysis
that was available to the Gurmankin court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Judith Gurmankin, a blind teacher certified in Pennsylvania,
brought suit against the Philadelphia School District challenging the
District's policy of not hiring handicapped teachers. Her complaint
alleged that the District had refused from 1969 through 1974 to allow
her to take its required teacher's examination, in furtherance of its
policy of preventing persons having a "chronic or acute physical de-
fect" 6 from teaching. In the spring of 1974, the District finally per-
mitted Ms. Gurmankin to take the exam. 7 She passed the written
portion but failed the oral section, which consisted of interviews with
two District officials. Consequently, she also alleged that she had
been the object of discrimination during the interviews. 8
Ms. Gurmankin sought and received a judgment for mandatory in-
junctive relief, in the form of a teaching position.9 In addition, she
was awarded seniority rights as accrued from September, 1970, the
time at which, the court ruled, it was reasonable to assume she would
have been hired in the absence of discrimination. Ten months after
the order, Ms. Gurmankin still had not been hired. The court
amended its injunction to mandate her placement within thirty days
in one of six schools of her choice. 10
5. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
6. 411 F. Supp. at 985.
7, The District's capitulation may have been encouraged by the enactment that year of a
state statute forbidding discrimination against the handicapped. Act of Dec. 19, 1974, P.L. 966,
No. 318, amending the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 952-55 (1975 Cum.
Supp.). Also recently enacted at that time was the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1974).
8. The validity of her allegations was established by the testimony of the Director of Per-
sonnel for the District that, at the time of the trial (May 8, 1975), "'current policy included 'a
restriction on the blind teaching the sighted.'' 411 F. Supp. at 986. The court also found that
the grading of the oral examination had been based on "misconceptions and stereotypes about
the blind and on assumptions that the blind simply cannot perform," in contravention of facts,
supplied by expert testimony, that indicated that blind teachers are competent, even to teach
sighted students. Id. at 987-88.
9. Id. at 992-93.
10. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 1977).
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THE GURMANKIN COURT'S ANALYSIS
Although the plaintiff presented three alternative claims," the
Gurmankin court based its decision solely on the constitutional doc-
trine of irrebuttable presumption. The finding of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption in the District's policy 12 would itself have been sufficient to
decide the case, the court stated, had not conflicting interpretations
as to the validity of the doctrine been presented by two recent Su-
preme Court decisions: Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur13
and Weinberger v. Salfi. 14
LaFleur, advanced by the Gurmankin plaintiff, was decided
squarely on irrebuttable presumption grounds. In LaFleur, the Su-
preme Court invalidated the Cleveland School Board's mandatory
maternity leave policy for teachers. The Court found the policy to
contain a presumption that every teacher four or more months preg-
nant was physically incapable of continuing her duties. Because the
teachers were offered no opportunity to show that the presumption
was incorrect as applied to them individually, the policy was ad-
judged conclusive and therefore unconstitutional as a violation of the
Due Process Clause. 15
11. In addition to the plaintiff's allegations that the policy contained an irrebuttable pre-
sumption, she contended that she had been denied equal protection as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Under that claim she asserted that preventing the handicapped from
teaching lacked a rational relationship, or, in the alternative, a fair and substantial relationship,
to the policy's purpose, and that the case presented a suspect classification. She also argued that
the policy violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1974). Plaintiff's
Complaint at 1; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 14 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Memo].
The court did not directly address the lack of a fair and substantial relationship argument. It
found the Rehabilitation Act to be inapplicable because it became effective only after most
of the discrimination alleged by the Gurnankin plaintiff had occurred.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1974).
Both the district court, 411 F. Supp. at 989, and the circuit court of appeals, 556 F.2d at 188,
implied that the Act conferred upon individuals affirmative rights enforceable in private law-
suits. Subsequent cases that have relied on Gurmankin have most often done so for this prop-
osition. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir. 1977); Dren-
non v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 814, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
12. The court found that "[t]he school board's policy of totally excluding blind persons as
teachers of sighted students created an irrebuttable presumption that blind persons could not be
competent teachers." 411 F. Supp. at 990.
13. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
14. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
15. 414 U.S. at 646.
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LaFleur drew support for its irrebuttable presumption basis from
principles established in a line of prior irrebuttable presumption
cases. It relied especially on one decision that struck down an Illinois
statute causing illegitimate children to become wards of the state
upon the mother's death without consideration of the natural father's
fitness as a parent. 16 The statute was found to embody a presump-
tion that unwed fathers are not fit parents, and was held unconstitu-
tional as a violation of both due process and equal protection. 17
LaFleur also relied on a later case that held unconstitutional Con-
necticut's requirement that non-resident students pay higher college
tuition than resident students.18 The Supreme Court in that case
forbade treating a student as a non-resident without providing him an
opportunity to show in-state residence, reasoning that such treatment
created an irrebuttable presumption.19
The defendant in Gurmankin asserted that a more recent case,
Weinberger v. Salfi, 20 controlled. That case upheld, on equal protec-
tion grounds, social security regulations under which surviving wives
and stepchildren were denied benefits if their relationship with the
deceased had begun less than nine months before the deceased's
death. This holding was in line with other equal protection cases in
which the plaintiff's interest was deemed to be merely economic. In
one such case, 2 ' a claim that welfare legislation violated equal protec-
tion was rejected with the following language:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply be-
cause the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality." 22
16. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. Id. at 658.
18. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Residency for an unmarried student was deter-
mined by where the student had lived within the year befbre he applied to the university. If he
had lived out-of-state at any time during that year, he was considered a non-resident, and was
treated as such for the duration of his university stay. Id. at 443.
19. Id. at 453.
20. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
21. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
22. Id. at 486, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
1202 [Vol. 27:1199
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Equal protection cases consider interests by their degree of funda-
mentalness 23 and classifications by their degree of suspectness. 24
Education, 25 public employment, 26 and welfare and the "necessities of
life" 27 have specifically been held not to be fundamental interests.
Since Salfi involved neither a fundamental interest nor a suspect clas-
sification, the only question to be considered by the Salft Court was
"whether Congress... could rationally have concluded... that the
expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified
the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule." 28 The Court con-
cluded that the "duration-of-relationship test meets this constitutional
standard" 29 and upheld the statute.
The Gurmankin defendant relied on Salfi not as an equal protec-
tion case, however, but as an irrebuttable presumption case that had
held for the defendant. The facts of Salfi do present an apparent ir-
rebuttable presumption, 30 but the irrebuttable presumption cases ad-
vanced by the plaintiff in Salfi, which included LaFleur, were dis-
tinguished by the Salfi Court, on the basis of the interests of the
plaintiffs. 31  It is because the Supreme Court decided Salfi on equal
protection grounds despite the apparent presence of an irrebuttable
presumption that the Gurmankin court reasoned that Salfi had "lim-
ited" the validity of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. 32
23. Fundamental interests have been held to include the right to association, Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); the right to privacy and autonomy, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); the right to free speech, Police Dep't. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); the right to vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); and the
right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966). a
24. Suspect classifications include race, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
and nationality, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
25. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
26. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976
(1973).
27. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
28. 422 U.S. at 777.
29. Id.
30. The presumption was that wives and stepchildren of less than nine months had entered
into a relationship with the deceased merely for the purpose of securing social security benefits.
Those affected by the presumption were not afforded an opportunity to disprove the attributed
illicit purpose, rendering the presumption irrebuttable. In fact, the district court in Salf held
for the plaintiff on irrebuttable presumption grounds. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961,
965-66 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
31. 422 U.S. at 771-72.
32. 411 F. Supp. at 990. The current state of the doctrine is uncertain. The concensus
seems to be that Salft (lid in fact restrict it. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974
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In determining which Supreme Court decision controlled the facts
before it, the Gurmankin court was also deciding which analysis it
would use. If LaFleur were found to control, irrebuttable presump-
tion would be the proper analysis. If Salfi emerged as controlling,
equal protection analysis would govern.
To make its determination, the Gurmankin court first compared
the plaintiffs' interests. It found that in LaFleur, the plaintiff's right
"to conceive and to raise children" was constitutionally protected. 33
On the other hand, it noted that the right to receive social security
disability benefits, the interest asserted by the Salfi plaintiff, was not
so protected. 34
Next the court examined classifications. It compared the classifica-
tion in Gurmankin, blindness, to that in LaFleur, pregnancy, and
found both to be, if not suspect, then at least ones that "should not
be subjected to inaccurate and irrebuttable presumptions of incompe-
tence." 35 In contrast, it found that the Salfi classification was not
suspect. 36
Finally, the Gurmankin court looked at the defendants' interests. It
noted that Salfi was based to a great extent on the administrative
Term, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 81 (1975). Some commen-
tators have gone farther. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 761, 771 (1977), where it was noted that "in... Salfi, Justice Rehnquist was able to
speak for the Court in an opinion that repudiated conclusive presumption analysis." But five
months after Salfj was decided, Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44
(1975) (per curiam), cited LaFleur as controlling and used the doctrine. Turner struck down a
Utah statute making pregnant women ineligible for employment compensation for a period from
twelve weeks before their due date to six weeks after childbirth. The statute was held uncon-
stitutional as a violation of due process because it contained an irrebuttable presumption that
women are unable to work during that eighteen-week period.
The latest case in the area is, as Turner was, a per curiam decision: Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)(per curiam). Murgia is thought to have marked
another retreat from the doctrine. See Note, The Burger Court's "Newest" Equal Protection:
irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine Rejected -Two-Tier Review Reinstated- Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 140 [hereinafter cited as
Wash. U. Note]. In Murgia the Court upheld a Massachusetts age-based mandatory retirement
statute without any reference to irrebuttable presumptions. The per curiam nature of this deci-
sion is particularly interesting in light of Justice Rehnquist's comment in his dissent to LaFleur
that the doctrine of irrebuttable presumption especially endangered mandatory retirement stat-
utes. 414 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even Justice Marshall's sole dissent in Murgia
makes no mention of the doctrine. 427 U.S. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. 411 F. Supp. at 990. Although LaFleur also involved employment, as does Gur'mankin,
neither the LaFleur nor the Curmnankin court addressed that fact.
34. Id. at 990, 991.
35. Id. at 991. Pregnancy, as a sex-related characteristic, might have been a sufficiently
suspect classification in itself to have allowed the LaFleur plaintiff to prevail on equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also notes 72 & 76 infra.
36. 411 F. Supp. at 991.
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difficulty and expense that would have resulted from providing every
social security claimant affected by the regulation with an individual
hearing. 37 No such problems, the court continued, would be encoun-
tered in granting hearings to people in the Gurmankin plaintiff's
position; few blind applicants wish to teach sighted students, and
"hearings" in the form of the teaching examination were already given
routinely to all applicants except the blind.38 Thus the strong de-
fendant's interest in Salfi was absent in Gurmnankin.39 On the basis
of these comparisons, LaFleur was found to be the more appropriate
precedent, and Gurmankin was decided on irrebuttable presumption
grounds.
CRITICISM OF GURMANKIN
The Gurmankin decision is vulnerable to criticism for two reasons.
First, it distorts LaFleur to fit the facts before it. Second, it uses the
doctrine of irrebuttable presumption, one of the most strongly
criticized constitutional theories, 40 while ignoring a more conven-
tional alternative to the use of that doctrine.
Misapplication of LaFleur
When considering the Gurmankin court's conclusion that LaFleur
controlled, it should be noted that irrebuttable presumption is pur-
portedly a Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine. 41 The pro-
tection offered by the Due Process Clause is limited to certain inter-
ests within the broad range of "life, liberty, and property." 42 The
LaFleur decision centered upon the finding of a protected due pro-
cess interest in the plaintiff's right to bear a child. The Court made it
clear that the mandatory maternity leave policy in question infringed
upon that interest. 43 The Salfi Court's decision was also based on the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The defendant's interest in LaFleur, preserving continuity of education and protecting
the health of the teacher and her unborn child, was not addressed. 414 U.S. at 643.
40. See note 56 infra.
41. See. e.g, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974), where it was
held that "the conclusive presumption embodied in these rules... is violative of the Due Pro-
cess Clause."
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No State shall.., deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
43. The policy in LaFleur was found to infringe upon "freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of marriage and family life... [which is] one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 414 U.S. at 639-40. The LaFleur Court referred to that
freedom as "one of the basic civil rights of man." Id. at 640, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
1978] 1205
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plaintiff's interest. There, however, social security benefits were
found not to be a protected interest.
The Gurnankin court acknowledged that the nature of the plain-
tiff's interest is central to the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
noting at the outset of its analysis that Salfi had been distinguished
from LaFleur and other irrebuttable presumption cases on the basis
of the interests involved. 44 It is thus astonishing that its discussion of
the plaintiff's interest in public employment was so summary. The
"analysis" consisted merely of an assertion that the plaintiff's interest
was "certainly more important" than that in Salfi, and of an admission
that it was not as important as that in LaFleur.45 The only case cited
by the court to support its assertions, 46 furthermore, emphasized
the relative unimportance of public employment in the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights and interests. It held that the "right
to be fairly considered for public employment" is not a fundamental
interest in the equal protection sense, and that "it is not likely that
such could be shown." 47
Because the protected due process right crucial in LaFleur is ab-
sent in Gurmankin, the Gurmankin court's conclusion that LaFleur
controlled is not persuasive. The court's cursory assessment of the
plaintiff's interest, however, is at once an admission and an introduc-
tion to the court's forthcoming creative efforts. For it is followed by a
lengthy and acute examination of the classification by which the Dis-
trict's policy operated, and it is actually upon that basis that the court
found for the plaintiff.
The District's policy, as applied to Ms. Gurmankin, separated those
it affected from those it did not by reference to one trait: blindness.
This was, the Gurmankin court found, "a far different kind of classifi-
cation than was involved in Salfl, and ...one that demands a greater
degree of constitutional protection." 4 8 Salfl, it continued, involved an
"artificial classification" that did not subject the Salfi plaintiffs to
other disadvantages. 49 By this the court meant that the Salfi classifi-
cation was merely legislatively created; it held no implications for
those it affected except with regard to one particular piece of legisla-
U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Why the case could not, then, have been decided on traditional non-
economic substantive due process grounds in an open question. See note 63 and accompanying
text infra.
44. 411 F. Supp. at 990.
45. Id. at 990-91.
46. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd inere., 410 U.S. 976
(1973).
47. Id. at 250.
48. 411 F. Supp. at 991.
49. Id.
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tion. In contrast, the court saw "the blind, like pregnant school
teachers," as an "objectively defined group." 50 That is, a classification
by blindness does have certain implications: "Ms. Gurmankin's blind-
ness permanently sets her apart from other people in a way that may
cause her to be treated differently from other people in every activity
she attempts to engage in." 5 1
In this section of its analysis the court seemed to make a case for
blindness as a suspect classification. 52 But more important is that it
even considered the classification in the District's policy, much less at
such great length. This approach is so unexpected because neither
LaFleur nor Salfi ever specifically mentioned classifications. Both
cases focused only on the parties' interests. Certainly there was no
implication whatever that the suspectness of the classifications figured
in the decisions. The Gurmankin court's comparison of the classifica-
tions in those cases to the classification before it was an assertion of
that factor's significance in those cases. That assertion was made to
support an analogy between Gurmankin and LaFleur that would have
collapsed had it been properly based only upon the plaintiffs' inter-
ests. LaFleur was found applicable only by this strained piece of
reasoning.
50. Id.
51. id.
52. A classification may be suspect for several reasons. It may stigmatize and embody no-
tions of superiority, affixing a badge of inferiority, or may be based on immutable conditions
present since birth. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), in which the
Court referred to a statute that excluded blacks from West Virginia grand juries as "practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority. See also Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), wherein the Court wrote:
To separate [black students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Id. at 494.
The classification may also be suspect because it affects a "discrete and insular minority," a
group that is politically powerless at least in part because of formally sanctioned laws against
them. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.). See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), in which the Court held that "[a]liens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom. . . heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate." The requirements for a suspect classification were recently reviewed
in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973):
[T]he class [must be] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Id. at 28. 0
All of these considerations were mentioned by the Gurmankin plaintiff. Plaintiff's Memo at
9-13. The Gurviankin court denied in dictum that it had been influenced by the plaintiff's
arguments:
I have no occasion to consider the equal protection arguments that have been stres-
sed by the parties. I will note, however, that the plaintiff's claim that the blind
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1199
Use of the Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
The second fault with Gurmankin lies in its use of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. The doctrine is so treacherous that the court
should have avoided it altogether. The doctrine's most subtle and
dangerous aspect is that it could apply in every case litigating an
overinclusive statute or policy. This is so because a law, by its very
nature, can only function by presuming, in the form of a classification.
Classifications are the means used to separate those who are intended
to be affected by a law from those who are not. Law-making bodies
are nearly always content with reaching only most of the people
sought to be affected by a law's purpose. That the statute also affects
some people who are not within the scope of its purpose is accepted,
for it is extremely rare to be able to achieve a "perfect fit" between
the means and the end of a law. 53  The use of a classification, al-
constitute a "suspect classification" is insupportable. Even admitting that the blind
are a small, politically weak minority that has been subjected to varying forms of
prejudice and discrimination, the limitations placed on a person's ability by a hand-
icap such as blindness cannot be ignored. Unlike distinctions based on race or re-
ligion, classifications based on blindness often can be justified by the different
abilities of the blind and the sighted.
411 F. Supp. at 992 n.8. But it is obvious that the court was significantly affected when it wrote
that Ms. Curmankin's blindness "permanently sets her apart from other people in a way that
may cause her to be treated differently from other people in every activity she attempts to
engage in," id. at 991, and observed that blind persons are subjected to disadvantages because
of their classification.
See In the Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1974) (physical handicaps
held to be "just the sort of 'immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth'
to which the 'inherently suspect' classification would be applied . .. '). See also Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a
"Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975). See
generally Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38 AM.
SCHOLAR 412 (1969); Richard et al., indices of Employer Prejudice Toward Disabled Applicants,
47 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 52 (1963); Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education:
The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 533 (1974); Note, Abroad in the Land:
Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 (1973).
53. The best evidence of the difficulty is that at the tipper tier of equal protection, where to
survive, a statute must be perfectly rational, -statutes are almost never upheld. See note 59
infra. A few have been sustained. See, e g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(exclusion of all Japanese citizens from certain West Coast areas upheld because of compelling
state interest created by war emergency); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (restriction
on employment of aliens upheld as necessary for welfare of unemployed U.S. citizens). See
generally Note, Constitutional Law-Lowering the Compelling State Interest Hurdle, 53
N.C.L. REV. 430 (1974). These cases, however, are in the distinct minority. The burden im-
posed by strict scrutiny has been called "fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 8 (1972).
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though a compromise, results in a law that is consistent, predictable,
convenient, and economical to administer.54
A classification is always a presumption that the law affects princi-
pally those whom it will serve the law's purpose to affect. Further-
more, unless a law by its terms offers an individual the opportunity to
controvert the presumption embodied in the classification, it may cor-
rectly be said to contain an irrebuttable presumption. Thus the Gur-
mankin court is correct when it states that the District's policy pre-
sents an irrebuttable presumption. 55 But its "finding" an irrebuttable
presumption is really nothing more than identifying an ever-present
part of the whole, the classification.
Several members of the Supreme Court, as well as commen-
tators, have been quick to point out this logical fallacy in the irre-
buttable presumption doctrine. 56 But only Justice Rehnquist has
noted the danger the use of the doctrine presents: "The Court's dis-
enchantment with 'irrebuttable presumptions,' and its preference for
'individualized determination,' is in the last analysis nothing less than
an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself." 57  And Justice
Rehnquist does not go far enough.
To understand the danger of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
it is important to realize that whenever it has been used, the statute
or policy in question has been found unconstitutional. 58  The "find-
54. Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72
MICH. L. REv. 800, 809 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Note]. For an excellent general
discussion of this area, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF.
L. RE. 341, 343-53 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
55. The policy's purpose was to ensure competence in the classroom. 411 F. Supp. at 990.
In furtherance of this purpose, the handicapped were excluded from teaching and, more specifi-
cally, the blind were excluded from teaching the sighted. The policy thus presumed that all
those who were handicapped were incompetent. Since, by operation of the policy, handicapped
persons were not given an opportunity to show that the presumption was incorrect in their
particular case, the presumption was irrebuttable.
56. Most notably, Justice Powell criticized the doctrine in LaFleur, stating: "As a matter of
logic, it is difficult to see the terminus of the road upon which the Court has embarked under
the banner of 'irrebuttable presumptions.'" 414 U.S. at 652. See also Gordon & Tenenbaum,
Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The Principle of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw. U.L. REV.
579, 590-91 (1976); Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal
Protection Continues, 24 CATH. U. L. REv. 217, 225-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Simson];
Harvard Note, supra note 4, at 1545; Michigan Note, supra note 54, at 829; Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 456 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Stanford Note].
57. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 47 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (no separate opinion); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1975) (majority
opinion); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (per
curiam); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646, 648 (1974); United States Dep't
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ing" of an irrebuttable presumption is tantamount to an automatic
declaration of unconstitutionality. The doctrine is, then, analogous to
strict scrutiny. 59
A doctrine that is invariably fatal, and that is characterized by
something present in every statute but "found" only in certain ones,
presents to a court an invincible weapon: the power to declare a stat-
ute unconstitutional at will. Alternatively, if the "triggering" device
for the doctrine is not merely the judge's whim, it is the cumulative
effect of nameless factors, never to be articulated and known only to
the court.
The use of a doctrine of this nature obviously erodes the principle
of stare decisis. Since the grounds for decision are disguised as the
"finding" of an irrebuttable presumption, they need not be specified.
Consequently, little precedent is set, and societal values are not rec-
ognized. 60 Further, the randomness with which decisions may be
made under the doctrine leads to the subversion of what should be
the most basic element in legal decision-making: the rule of law. 61
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453, 454
(1973).
59. In equal protection analysis, strict scrutiny requires a statute involving either a funda-
mental interest or a suspect classification to have a purpose that is "'necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest." "Necessary" means that the purpose cannot be accomplished in a less
detrimental way. That is, it must not be possible to use a classification that is less overinclusive
or less underinclusive. Theoretically, therefore, only a perfect relationship between the means
and the end-"perfect rationality"-will enable a law examined under strict scrutiny analysis to
sustain constitutional challenge. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 54, at 343-53. .
The degree of perfection demanded in the irrebuttable presumption cases is at least equal to
that required of upper-tier equal protection cases, and, possibly greater. Note the absolutism of
the Vlandis Court's demand for rationality: "'[lit is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny
an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of
nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact .... " 412
U.S. at 452 (emphasis added), quoted with approval in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 646 (1974). See also Simson, supra note 56, at 226-27; Stanford Note, supra note 56,
at 460 n.62.
60. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "Distressingly, the
Court applies 'strict scrutiny' and invalidates Connecticut's statutory scheme without explaining
why the statute impairs a genuine constitutional interest truly worthy of the standard of close
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 460.
61. Professor Levy has written eloquently decrying such result-oriented adjudication:
In constitutional cases . . . the judge who first chooses what the outcome should be
and then reasons backwards to supply a rationalization, replete with rules and pre-
cedents, has betrayed his calling: Having decided on the basis of prejudice or pre-
judgment, he has made constitutional law little more than the embodiment of his
own policy preferences.
L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAw 438 (1974). "It is difficult to deny," concurs Raoul Berger, "that 'a
result-oriented adjudication . . . is a corruption of the judicial process, that leaves too far behind
the rule of law enforced by impersonal and objective judges."' R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 330 (1977), quoting Levy, supra, at 438. Contra, O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
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The confusion surrounding the doctrine of irrebuttable presumption
is another reason for avoiding it. The Gurmankin court unavoidably
introduced into its own opinion the confusion that has resulted from
the use of the doctrine by the Supreme Court.
The most baffling aspect of this purported due process doctrine is
that no case using it has ever specified whether the doctrine employs
procedural62 or non-economic substantive63 due process. The doc-
trine's core is procedural; the plaintiff's lack of opportunity to con-
trovert the presumption against him forms the very essence of the
irrebuttable presumption cases.6 4 But the rights protected by the
doctrine are sometimes non-economic substantive due process
rights.6 5 The LaFleur Court's discussion of the plaintiff's interest in
child-bearing, for example, is based solely on her right to privacy as
guaranteed by the Constitution. 66 No mention is made in either
LAW 1 (1923); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U.CHI. L. REV. 661, 690-91 (1960).
62. In order for a right to be protected by procedural due process, a plaintiff must show a
"legitimate claim of entitlement . . . created . . . by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law .. " Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972). To determine whether procedural due process requirements apply, a court "look[s]
not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575
(1975) (emphasis in original). As the Roth Court was careful to point out, "[tihe requirements of
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. . . . the range of interests protected by
procedural due process is not infinite." 408 U.S. at 569-70.
63. As used in this Note, the term "non-economic substantive due process" refers to the
application to the states of the rights protected by the first eight amendments to the Constitu-
tion. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). These "fundamental rights" are sub-
sumed within the word "liberty" in the due process clause. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), which held these rights to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Others have called non-economic substantive due process "the incorporation doctrine." This is
an improper term for two reasons. First, it was not the Bill of Rights itself that was incorporated
into the due process clause but the rights protected by the Bill of Rights. As Justice Black has
stated: "[O]ur Court has since the Adamson case held most of the specific Bill of Rights' protec-
tions applicable to the States to the same extent they are applicable to the Federal Govern-
ment." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Second, the Constitution makes oo mention of the word "incorporation" but refers specifically
to due process.
Those who call non-economic substantive due process "the incorporation doctrine" do so be-
cause they fear that the use of the former term will be confused with economic substantive due
process, the thoroughly discredited analysis of the Lochner era. See note 90 infra. Consistently
specifying which of the three forms of due process is being used-procedural, economic sub-
stantive, or non-economic substantive-avoids needless confusion and allows the use of proper
nomenclature.
64. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973): "[S]tandards of due process require that
the State allow . . . an individual the opportunity to present evidence that he is a bona fide
resident entitled to the in-state rates." Id. at 452. See also id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
66. Id.
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LaFleur or Gurmankin of a procedural due process interest. 67  Other
irrebuttable presumption cases, however, contain neither non-
economic substantive due process rights 68 nor procedural due process
claims. The source of the rights recognized in those cases is not at all
clear.
Another cause of confusion in Gurmankin and the Supreme Court's
irrebuttable presumption cases is the appearance of language and
concepts not associated with the doctrine's purported due process na-
ture. Although the practical effects of due process and equal protec-
tion are not critically different, 69 the occurrence of equal protection
ideas in a due process doctrine leads to great uncertainty as to the
actual nature of the doctrine. The Gurmankin court's attention to the
plaintiff's interest, the defendant's interest, and the classification is
indicative of this problem. The consideration of all three factors
suggests equal protection, not due process, analysis. In due process
analysis, classifications are not relevant.70
67. Although no procedural due process claim was made in Gurniankin, the reviewing court
affirmed on precisely that basis, compounding the confusion. The circuit court of appeals stres-
sed not the LaFleur plaintiff's non-economic substantive due process interest in child-bearing
but her procedural due process/property interest in continuing employment, which existed by
virtue of her contract of employment. 556 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1977). Having shifted from the
focus of the district court, the appellate court then pointed out that the Guriankin plaintiff too
had had a procedural due process/property interest, because she possessed "an expectation,
based on state law, of being admitted to the qualifying examination." Id. Because she had been
certified as a teacher by the State of Pennsylvania, the appellate court went on, she was un-
qualifiedly eligible under Pennsylvania law to take the Philadelphia School District's examina-
tion. The court said, "The right to take the exam is a right arising under state law, and its
deprivation in an arbitrary manner violated due process." Id. at 188.
The appellate court seemed to indicate that this had been the holding of the district court. It
agreed with the lower court that LaFleur controlled and that the District's policy presented an
irrebuttable presumption, and then went on to make the above modifications.
68. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food
stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (tuition fees). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 98 S.
Ct. 1338 (1978) (dictum).
69. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954):
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. [But] [t]he "equal protection
of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process
of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable
phrases.
id. at 499. See also Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 27 & n.146 (1977).
70. In due process analysis of any sort, the only pertinent factors are the plaintiff's and the
defendant's interest. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 159 (1973) (non-economic
substantive due process) (plaintiff's interest: privacy; defendant's interest: protecting health of
pregnant woman and unborn child); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (procedural
due process) (uninterrupted receipt of welfare benefits; preventing increase in fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (economic substantive due
process) (freedom to contract; same).
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Some commentators, as well as members of the Supreme Court,
have identified the irrebuttable presumption doctrine as an equal pro-
tection theory. 71 It is, in fact, possible that Gurmankin was actually
decided on sliding-scale equal protection grounds. 72 The Gurmankin
court stated:
Given Ms. Gurmankin's interest in obtaining employment and the
insignificance of the burdens that would be placed on the school
district if it allowed blind persons an opportunity to demonstrate
their competence, I find that the . . . District's policy of refusing
to consider blind persons to be teachers . . . created an irrebut-
table presumption. .. 73
The presence, absence, nature, or weight of the factors enumerated
by the court have nothing whatsoever to do with the presence or
absence of an irrebuttable presumption. If this reference to all three
factors considered in equal protection analysis has any meaning at all,
it is that sliding-scale equal protection analysis is being used.
Some language in the irrebuttable presumption cases implies that the same is true for that
doctrine. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (White, J., concurring): "[I]t must now
be obvious . . . that, as the Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest
escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings
• . . will be sufficient to justify . . . irrational discriminations." Id. at 459. See also Turner v.
Board of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975): "The Fourteenth Amendment requires that
unemployment compensation boards . . . must achieve legitimate state ends through more indi-
vidualized means when basic human liberties are at stake." Id. at 46.
71. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring):
"[When the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is used,] the concept at root often will be some-
thing else masquerading as a due process doctrine. That something else, of course, is the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 652. See also Stanford Note, supra note 56, at 468.
72. The theory of sliding-scale equal protection was propounded by Justice Marshall in San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under this theory,
which represents Justice Marshall's view of how the Court actually proceeds in equal protection
analysis without so stating, a statute need not contain a fundamental interest or a suspect clas-
sification to warrant scrutiny. Instead, the degree of fundamentalness of an interest and the
degree of suspectness of a classification are weighed against the state's interest. In other words,
"[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest
draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judi-
cial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). A nexus between a classification and a well-established suspect classification is
similarly treated.
For an exhaustive string citation of cases in which Justice Marshall considers the Court to
have used a level of scrutiny more intense than that which seemed warranted and attributes it
to their use of sliding-scale equal protection analysis, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 411 F. Supp. at 991 (emphasis added).
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There are numerous cases which seem to have used sliding-scale
equal protection analysis. 74 Neither a fundamental interest nor a sus-
pect classification was present, yet the statute was closely scrutinized.
In such cases, the official two-tier theory of equal protection dictates
that the statute need only employ a classification that is "rationally
related to a legitimate state objective." 75 These cases, however, were
by no means clearly decided under sliding-scale equal protection. 76
Further, the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized, much
less formally adopted, that analysis. 77 Finally, even to the extent it
was used implicitly, commentators feel that sliding-scale equal protec-
tion ha's been rendered invalid by recent Supreme Court decisions. 78
The Gurmankin court declared its ground for decision to be ir-
rebuttable presumption but recited a sliding-scale equal protection
argument. If the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is sliding-scale
analysis, it should be identified as such. Disguising the latter analysis
as irrebuttable presumption to avoid reversal for having used a tenu-
otis doctrine is disingenuous and confusing. If the doctrine is not
sliding-scale analysis, then the bulk of the court's opinion is extrane-
Otis.
AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY
The Gurmankin court "found" an irrebuttable presumption in the
District's policy because it wanted to hold for a sympathetic plaintiff
where no legitimate, well-defined analysis would allow it to do so.
74. E.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (interest: social security benefits; clas-
sification: illegitimacy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (disability insurance benefits;
sex); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (wages; indigency); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Workmen's Compensation benefits; illegitimacy).
75. See note 80 infra.
76. One case, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), has been interpreted in at least three
ways. First, it has been termed a middle-tier equal protection case. This middle level of
scrutiny, not yet "official" because the Supreme Court has never explicitly referred to it. per-
tains principally to cases involving sexual classifications. The statute in cases of this type is
scrutinized more closely than it would he at the lower tier, even though there is no fundamen-
tal interest or suspect classification involved. The enunciated standard such statutes must meet
to survive a constitutional challenge is that a "fair and substantial relationship" exist between
the means and the end. Id. at 76.
Second, it has been held to be a lower-tier equal protection case that contained "no rational
relationship." Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 865 n.7, 506 P.2d 212, 219 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388, 395 n.7 (1973). See also text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
Finally, Reed has been labeled a sliding-scale equal protection case. Wash. U. Note, supra
note 32, at 145 n.25.
77. Any references to it have been made only in dissent. See note 72 supra.
78. See, e.g., Simson, supra note 56, at 219 & n.20; Wash. U. Note, supra note 32, at 145,
152. See also Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 508, 533-36 (1974).
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Public employment is not a fundamental interest and blindness is not
a suspect classification; therefore strict-scrutiny, equal protection did
not avail. Public employment is clearly not a non-economic substan-
tive due process right, and no procedural due process argument was
made, so neither conventional form of due process would serve. And
sliding-scale equal protection analysis is unpredictable, unreliable and
possibly discredited.
An alternative ground for decision-the presence of "no rational
relationship" in the District's policy-offered the Gurmankin court
an opportunity to decide the case in favor of the plaintiff without
resorting to the doctrine 6f irrebuttable presumption. Although the
court acknowledged that the District's policy bore "no rational basis,"
or relationship, to the ability of the blind to teach, 79 it failed to ad-
dress the significance of its finding.
The presence of a rational relationship between the end and the
means of a statute is a minimum requirement for constitutionality
under the Equal Protection Clause.80 Because the phrase is a term of
art, endowed with great significance, it must be assumed that its use
by a court is never casual. Thus, a finding of "no rational relation-
ship" requires that the statute in question be found unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection.
A 1973 federal district court case remarkably similar to Gurmankin,
Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District,81 supports the
feasibility of such a ground for decision. In Andrews, the two plain-
tiffs, both women fully qualified as teacher's aides, were denied
employment because the school district's local policy forbade hiring
unwed parents. The challenged policy was held to be a violation of
equal protection. The Andrews court noted the presence of an ir-
rebuttable presumption in the policy before it. Citing Stanley v. I1-
79. The court wrote: "The fact that over 400 blind persons are teaching nationally ...
shows that there was no rational basis for the School District's practice of completely excluding
blind teachers from teaching sighted students." 411 F. Supp. at 986 (emphasis added).
80. If a statute involves neither a fundamental interest nor a suspect classification, it falls
into the lower level of the two-tier theory, known as "mininmal scrutiny." At this level, a statute
is, at least in effect, presumed constitutional until it is shown to be unconstitutional. In contrast,
a statute is, again, at least in effect, presumed unconstitutional at the upper level. The classifica-
tion need only bear a "rational relationship to a legitimate state [objective]." McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1968). A "rational relationship" is one in which
even over-and underinclusiveness are tolerated. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955). Only the lack of any relationship between the means and the end, to judge by
the language of the standard, will render such a statute unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. Thus the application of the "rational relationship" standard is nearly synonymous with
the upholding of the statute in question.
81. 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. denied as improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976).
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linois,8 2 it stated: "The unconstitutional vice of the policy.., is that it
conclusively presumes the parents' immorality or bad moral character
from the single fact of a child born out of wedlock." 8 3 Nevertheless,
it ignored Stanley's rationale, basing its decision squarely on a finding
of "no rational relationship." 84
Brown v. Merlo8 5 offers additional support for this approach. The
California Supreme Court in Brown found that the California guest
statute created three classifications; 8 6 that none of the classifications
included a findamental interest or a suspect classification; and that
minimum equal protection scrutiny was therefore appropriate.8 7  It
then held the statute unconstitutional because its means bore no ra-
tional relationship to its purpose.88
It is interesting indeed that a finding so familiar and dispositive as
"no rational relationship," though present in several United States
Supreme Court irrebuttable presumption cases8 9 as well as in Gur-
mankin, was seized upon by neither the Supreme Court nor the
Gurmankin district court as a ground for decision. One explanation
may be that the courts feared accusations of having used the discred-
ited doctrine of economic substantive due process. 90 Because that
82. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
83. 371 F. Supp. at 33 (emphasis added).
84. The Andrews court wrote:
[T]he policy or practice of barring an otherwise qualified person from being
employed, or considered for employment, in the public schools merely because of
one's previously having had an illegitimate child has no rational relationship to the
objectives ostensibly sought to be achieved by the school officials .. . thus it is
constitutionally defective under the traditional, and miost lenient, standard of equal
protection ...
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
85. 8 Cal.3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
86. The statute discriminated between automobile guests and other, social guests; between
automobile passengers (paying riders) and automobile guests (non-paying riders) in the driver's
car; and between different sub-classifications of automobile guests, such as guests injured on the
highway and those injured on a private road. Id. at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
87. Id. at 861 & 862 n.2, 506 P.2d at 216 & n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 & n.2.
88. id. at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407. See Note, Rationality of Guest
Statute Classifications Questioned, 53 NEB. L. REV. 267 (1974); Note, 23 CATtI. U. L. REV. 402
(1973).
89. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1973). The three-judge district court panel in Murgia found "no
rational relationship" and based its decision for the plaintiff on that finding. 376 F. Supp. 753,
754 (D. Mass. 1974). The Supreme Court specifically reversed. 427 U.S. at 312.
90. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The use of
economic substantive due process is universally disapproved, although neither its evil nor its
definition is quite clear. It has been seen as an examination of the formulation of a policy's or
statute's empirical bases-that is, its means, its ends, and the facts the legislature used to arrive
at both. Michigan Note, supra note 54, at 821-22. See also Ratner, The Function of the Due
Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1071 (1968). It has also been defined as "the judicial
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doctrine is characterized by examining the means, ends, and legisla-
tive facts of a statute, and a finding of "no rational relationship" im-
pugns a statute's means, such a finding does seem vulnerable to
attack. Yet even the Supreme Court, which recoils from basing deci-
sions on economic substantive due process, 91 has used the "no ra-
tional relationship" rationale to strike down statutes. 92
It is tempting to draw two conclusions from the Court's use of that
analysis: that its failure to employ the analysis in the irrebuttable pre-
sumption cases is not explained by its fear of engaging in economic
substantive due process analysis, and that lower courts should there-
fore not hesitate to rely on "no rational relationship" to void a statute.
But most likely the pitfalls of economic substantive due process are
too well documented, and judicial aversion to it too strong, to give
"no rational relationship" analysis a chance of widespread success.
Except in the most grossly over-or underinclusive statutes or policies,
like that in Gurmankin, the analysis will most likely not provide re-
lief.
CONCLUSION
If the physically disabled are to prevail on a constitutional theory
at all, their suspect-classification attributes present the most promise.
Their very designation - "handicapped" - states their credentials as
protected citizens. Racial minorities, an established suspect classifica-
tion, were found only after litigation to have been so often denied
opportunities to gain employment, equal transportation facilities, and
quality schools that they could properly be said to be "handicapped."
For those who start out physically disabled, the description is im-
mediately apt.
If the handicapped are not eventually held to be a suspect class,
they may have no constitutional remedy to employment discrimina-
tion except the doctrine of irrebuttable presumption. That doctrine
was used by a federal district court in Gurnankin to produce good
results. But the favorable outcome in that case cannot offset the
danger presented by the continued use of the doctrine. The disabled
practice of constitutionalizing values that cannot fairly be inferred from the constitutional text,
the structure of government ordained by the Constitution, or historical materials clarifying
otherwise vague constitutional provisions." Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections
On (And Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 419 (1977). See generally Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 937-43 (1973).
91. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
92. See, e.g., United States Dep't. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78-79 (1972).
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thus may have to rely on one of the numerous state and federal anti-
discrimination statutes to enforce their rights to employment. Al-
though the Constitution is a marvelously expansive document, it does
not and cannot shield every interest and group that claims its protec-
tion. It is of utmost importance to respect its limitations.
Daniel A. Richman
